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TOPPS GETS EXCLUSIVE LICENSE, 
LEAVING UPPER DECK ON THE 
BENCH: AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION IN THE MODERN ERA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Baseball is “America’s pastime.”  Like most things with such a long 
history, the game has certainly seen its fair share of minor changes, but the 
basic rules have remained largely unchanged.  Simply put, it is still “three 
strikes, and you’re out!” 
Major League Baseball’s (MLB or Major League) antitrust exemption has 
a similarly long and steady history.  Since its inception in 1922,1 the MLB 
antitrust exemption has been challenged numerous times.  Just as the rules of 
the game have slightly changed throughout its history while still remaining 
pretty much the same, so too has the exemption been slightly altered, 
specifically through Congress’ enactment of the Curt Flood Act.2  However, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the existence of the 
exemption and has seemingly left it to Congress to narrow the exemption’s 
scope.3  Thus, as it stands today, MLB still retains its broad exemption from 
the federal antitrust laws. 
In 2009, MLB entered into a licensing agreement with the Topps baseball 
card company, granting the company exclusive rights to the use of MLB 
trademarks on baseball cards.4  Thus, Upper Deck, a former Major League 
Baseball Properties’ (MLBP) licensee, was no longer able to legally use these 
marks.5  Similar MLB licensing deals have been challenged in the past,6 but 
1. See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200 (1922). 
2. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2011). 
3. See generally Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 
407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
4. Tom Singer, MLB Announces Exclusive Deal with Topps: Move Designed to Streamline, 
Stimulate Trading-Card Market, MLB.COM (Aug. 6, 2009), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd 
=20090806&content_id=6276188&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
5. MLB Props., Inc. v. The Upper Deck Co., No.10 Civ. 732, *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), 
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york /nysdce/1:2010cv00732/ 
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the antitrust exemption has not been scrutinized in this particular context.  In 
light of the National Football League’s (NFL) recent unsuccessful attempt to 
employ the single-entity defense in a similar licensing context in American 
Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,7 some commentators argued that the 
licensing deal with Topps represented a unique opportunity for a challenge to 
MLB’s antitrust exemption.8  Although Upper Deck did not bring such a 
challenge, this Comment uses this licensing deal as a basis for analyzing the 
exemption in the modern era. 
Part II of this Comment provides a history of MLB’s antitrust exemption 
and its challenges and explains that the heart of modern challenges to the 
exemption relate to the nature and extent of its scope.  Part III describes the 
American Needle case and the single-entity argument employed by the NFL.  
Part IV discusses MLB’s exclusive license deal with Topps and why Upper 
Deck may have missed an opportunity to challenge MLB’s antitrust exemption 
in light of American Needle.  This section also asserts that were the exemption 
challenged in the intellectual property and licensing contexts, MLB could use 
many of the NFL’s failed single-entity arguments to explain how its actions 
are covered under the scope of MLB’s exemption as it exists today. 
II. HISTORY OF MLB’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
To fully appreciate the breadth of MLB’s antitrust exemption, it is first 
necessary to examine its origins and history.  Typically, the Sherman Act, a 
federal antitrust law, serves as one of the primary ways to regulate MLB and 
other professional sports.  However, MLB is almost entirely exempt from the 
purview of the Sherman Act.  This exemption stems from a trio of Supreme 
Court cases that form the “Baseball Trilogy,” as well as a long history of lower 
court judicial decisions and legislative actions. 
A. Sherman Act 
One fundamental economic principle is that a free, open, and competitive 
market should generally result in a market that is the most beneficial for all 
357850/28/. 
6. See, e.g., MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
7. See generally 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
8. See J. Gordon Hylton, Does Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity Extend to Baseball Card 
Contracts?, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Aug. 14, 2009), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/ 
2009/08/14/does-baseballs-antitrust-immunity-extend-to-baseball-card-contracts/; see also Matt 
Straquadine, Baseball Card Contract Raises Antitrust Concerns, THE AM L. DAILY (Aug. 10, 2009), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 2009/08/topps-baseball-cards.html. 
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parties involved.9  Specifically, when competitive forces govern the 
availability and price of a given product in a competitive market, it should 
“yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .”10  With these concepts 
in mind, as well as a growing concern regarding anticompetitive activity from 
dominant firms, Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 189011 “to preserve a 
competitive marketplace and protect consumer welfare.”12 
Section One of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States . . . .”13  The focus of Section One is on agreements between 
two or more competitors that unreasonably restrain trade.  In order to 
demonstrate a violation of Section One, the plaintiff must show evidence of 
“(1) concerted action that (2) unreasonably restrains (3) interstate 
commerce.”14 
To determine whether a given restraint is one that unreasonably restrains 
trade, courts take one of two approaches.  A rule of reason analysis consists of 
an in-depth, multi-step burden-shifting test.15  The plaintiff must show the 
anticompetitive effects of a given restraint.16  If successful, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to proffer procompetitive justifications for the restraint.17  
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that notwithstanding 
these procompetitive justifications, the same objectives could have been 
achieved through less restrictive means.18  The other approach, the per se 
analysis, condemns the challenged practices as unreasonable restraints of trade 
without any elaborate inquiries into the particular circumstances because of 
their facially clear anticompetitive effect.19  Typically, actions of professional 
sports leagues are analyzed under the rule of reason approach because the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the sports industry is one “in which 
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
9. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1, 2 (6th ed. 2010). 
10. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
11. PITOFSKY, supra note 9, at 1. 
12. MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 421 (2d ed. 2009). 
13. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2011). 
14. Brittany Van Roo, One Trilogy That Should Go Without a Sequel: Why the Baseball Antitrust 
Exemption Should Be Repealed, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 381, 383 (2010). 
15. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 405–06. 
19. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). 
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available at all,”20 and these restraints may actually enhance competition.21 
B. The “Baseball Trilogy” 
Generally, the Sherman Act represents “one of the primary bodies of 
public law used to regulate professional sports.”22  For the most part, MLB 
has been entirely exempt from the purview of the antitrust laws.  The history 
of this exemption can be traced through three primary Supreme Court cases, 
known as the “Baseball Trilogy.”23 
MLB’s antitrust exemption was judicially created in 1922 in Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs.24  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired to 
monopolize the business of baseball by buying or inducing the Federal League 
clubs to leave their league.25  In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court 
held that MLB was not subject to the antitrust laws because it was not engaged 
in interstate commerce.26  In his oft-quoted line, Justice Holmes famously 
stated, “[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state 
affairs.”27 
More than thirty years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
revisit the exemption.  In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,28 the Court 
noted that “[t]he business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the 
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation,” and that 
if the exemption was to be repealed, it was a task for Congress rather than the 
judiciary.29  Thus, the Court affirmed the exemption. 
Finally, in 1972, faced again with a challenge to MLB’s reserve system, 
the Court in Flood v. Kuhn30 reaffirmed baseball’s exemption from the 
Sherman Act’s regulatory scheme.31  The Court recognized that the exemption 
is an anomaly because “[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged 
20. Id. at 101. 
21. Id. at 102. 
22. MITTEN, supra note 12, at 421. 
23. PETER A. CARFAGNA, SPORTS AND THE LAW: EXAMINING THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF 
AMERICA’S THREE “MAJOR LEAGUES” 34 (2009). 
24. See generally 259 U.S. 200. 
25. Id. at 207–08. 
26. Id. at 208. 
27. Id. 
28. See generally 346 U.S. 356. 
29. Id. at 357. 
30. See generally 407 U.S. 258. 
31. Id. at 285. 
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in interstate commerce,”32 but noted the long history of the exemption and that 
“there is merit in consistency even though some might claim that beneath that 
consistency is a layer of inconsistency.”33  As in Toolson, the Court again 
insisted that any inconsistency should be remedied legislatively rather than by 
the Court, given Congress’ “positive inaction” allowing the decision to stand 
for so long.34 
C. Lower Court and Legislative Challenges 
Following Flood, the actions of both the courts and Congress demonstrate 
the continued intent to retain what is typically understood to be an exemption 
that is broad in scope.35  Through the years, the MLB exemption has faced 
numerous challenges.  Though some construe the exemption as applicable to a 
broader range of activities than others, the decisions of the lower courts are 
evidence of a general reluctance to narrow MLB’s broad antitrust exemption. 
1. Lower Court Challenges 
Antitrust suits against MLB have been brought under a variety of different 
situations, with these suits generally arising in cases regarding MLB’s reserve 
clause36 or regarding issues of franchise relocation.37  Some courts, such as 
the one in Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc.,38 
have taken the same course of action as the Supreme Court did in Toolson, and 
simply acknowledged the existence of the exemption and the fact that it is an 
anomaly.  Following stare decisis, these courts leave it to Congress to take any 
action regarding the exemption.39  Other courts have taken more in-depth 
approaches. 
For instance, in Gardella v. Chandler,40 an antitrust suit regarding a 
challenge to MLB’s reserve clause taking place in 1949, before Toolson and 
well before Flood, the Second Circuit refused to blindly follow the reasoning 
set out in Federal Baseball.41  Although the court agreed with the general 
32. Id. at 282. 
33. Id. at 284. 
34. Id. at 283–84. 
35. See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 26b. 
36. See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. 258. 
37. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966). 
38. See generally 282 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960). 
39. Id. at 680. 
40. See generally 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). 
41. See generally id. 
PADOVE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:04 PM 
240 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
holding in Federal Baseball, it focused on substantial advances in technology 
since the time of that landmark decision in 1922.42  Specifically, the Gardella 
court felt that the exemption was simply inapplicable due to the rise of radio 
and television that changed what was once a purely intrastate affair into a 
clearly interstate affair.43  Thus, the court remanded the case back to the lower 
court to decide the issues under the Sherman Act.44  After Gardella, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged this same shift of baseball from an intrastate to 
an obviously interstate affair, making the exemption an anomaly, but the Court 
has yet to take the next step and allow for analysis under the Sherman Act.  
Instead, the Court has left it to Congress to decide to take action regarding the 
exemption.45 
In an early franchise-relocation case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
took a vastly different approach to that taken in Gardella.46  Following the 
announcement of the Milwaukee Braves’ relocation to Atlanta and the 
subsequent decline in team performance and attendance, the State of 
Wisconsin brought an antitrust suit against the Milwaukee Braves under state 
antitrust laws.47  Unlike the suit in Gardella, which took place before Toolson, 
this suit was filed shortly after Toolson.  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
lead, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deferred to Congress to alter the 
exemption, and thus did not allow the plaintiff to circumvent the exemption 
through the use of state antitrust laws.48 
Although Flood reaffirmed the continued existence of MLB’s 
exemption,49 in the opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court referred only to the MLB 
reserve system.50  Thus, judicial challenges following Flood have not been 
concerned with the exemption’s existence.  Instead, the modern focus is on the 
scope of the exemption, with plaintiffs often arguing that, based on Flood, the 
exemption only applies to the reserve system and not to any other aspects of 
the business of baseball.51  As the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue 
of the MLB exemption since Flood in 1972, the question of its scope has an 
extensive history of its own and is an ongoing battle. 
42. Id. at 411. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 415. 
45. See generally Flood, 407 U.S. 258. 
46. See generally Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d 1. 
47. See generally id. 
48. Id. at 18. 
49. See generally Flood, 407 U.S. 258. 
50. Id. at 259, 282. 
51. See Finley, 569 F.2d at 540. 
PADOVE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:04 PM 
2011]   UPPER DECK AND MLB’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION  241 
 
For instance, in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n,52 
the Southern District of Texas took a narrow view of MLB’s exemption.53  In 
this case, the defendant cancelled the plaintiff’s contract to broadcast Houston 
Astros games.54  The plaintiff alleged that horizontal restraints were imposed 
on the greater Houston radio market through various anticompetitive acts of 
the defendant relating to the cancellation of the broadcasting contract.55  
Relying on Gardella and Flood, the court framed the issue as whether “radio 
broadcasting is so much a part of baseball that it, as well as baseball, is exempt 
from the antitrust laws.”56  In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss based 
on the MLB antitrust exemption, the court stated, “[t]he issue in the case is not 
baseball but a distinct and separate industry, broadcasting . . . .  The reserve 
clause and other ‘unique characteristics and needs’ of the game have no 
bearing at all on the questions presented.”57 
Similarly, in holding that no preemption of state antitrust laws existed due 
to MLB’s federal antitrust exemption, the Southern District of New York in 
Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs58 determined that, 
like broadcasting, relationships with non-players were not unique 
characteristics or needs of the game deserving of an exemption from the 
federal antitrust laws.59  Specifically, “[a]nti-competitive conduct toward 
umpires is not an essential part of baseball and in no way enhances its vitality 
or viability.”60 
Arguably, the most unique lower court decision is a case regarding a 
franchise relocation decision, Piazza v. Major League Baseball.61  In Piazza, 
the plaintiffs claimed federal antitrust violations regarding MLB’s alleged 
efforts to prevent the plaintiffs from purchasing the San Francisco Giants and 
relocating the franchise to Tampa, Florida.62  The court undertook a 
comprehensive stare decisis analysis and concluded that many courts 
improperly applied the doctrine of stare decisis by focusing purely on the 
52. See generally 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 
53. See generally id. 
54. Id. at 264. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 268. 
57. Id. at 271. 
58. See generally 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
59. Id. at 1489. 
60. Id. 
61. See generally 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
62. Id. at 421. 
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result in Flood rather than focusing on its reasoning.63  Following this 
reasoning, the defendant’s arguments were dismissed, as the court held that the 
concept of stare decisis, when properly applied, required an extremely narrow 
view of MLB’s exemption, limited purely to the reserve clause, the 
“reasoning” within the stare decisis analysis.64  Finding this interesting and 
unique standard to be the correct form of analysis, some other lower courts 
followed suit.65 
However, even the judge in Piazza recognized that other lower courts had 
refused to follow such a narrow reading of Flood, and, thus, undertook an 
alternative analysis under the assumption that the exemption extended beyond 
the reserve clause.66  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the 
question of whether the market for ownership interests in baseball franchises 
was central to the unique characteristics and needs of baseball exhibitions.67  
Although the court would have refused to grant the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss based on the exemption under this reasoning as well, it did recognize 
that franchise relocation decisions could potentially relate to matters of league 
structure, an area generally considered to be a unique characteristic and need 
of the game.68  Regardless, many lower courts reference Piazza for the 
aforementioned, very narrow stare decisis reasoning rather than for this 
alternative analysis.69 
But, many lower courts have refused to frame the scope of MLB’s 
antitrust exemption in such a narrow light.  For instance, in Charles O. Finley 
& Co. v. Kuhn,70 a case exemplifying a broad interpretation of the 
exemption’s scope, the Seventh Circuit looked to the “Baseball Trilogy” for 
guidance and found it clear from those cases that the entire “business of 
baseball” is exempt from the federal antitrust laws.71  The Finley court, like 
the courts in favor of a narrow scope for the exemption, noted the specific 
references to the reserve clause scattered throughout the reasoning in Flood.72  
However, unlike those courts that concluded that these references supported a 
63. Id. at 438. 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). 
66. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438–39. 
67. Id. at 440. 
68. Id. at 441. 
69. See, e.g., Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1023–24. 
70. See generally 569 F.2d 527. 
71. Id. at 541. 
72. Id. at 540–41. 
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narrow scope,73 the court explained that the Supreme Court decisions 
indicated an overall intent “to exempt the business of baseball . . . [and not 
merely a] particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws.”74 
Regardless of the persuasiveness of Piazza, many lower courts have 
chosen to follow the reasoning in Finley and have employed a broad 
interpretation of the scope of MLB’s exemption.75  For instance, the courts in 
New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Professional 
Baseball Leagues,76 McCoy v. Major League Baseball,77 and Minnesota 
Twins Partnership v. Minnesota78 all denounced the reasoning in Piazza, with 
one court describing it as going against the “great weight of authority” that 
recognizes the scope of the exemption as the “business of baseball.”79  In 
Minnesota Twins Partnership, the Minnesota Supreme Court further explained 
that the court in Piazza simply tried to make sense of the anomaly but in the 
process chose to ignore the key concept in Flood.80  That is, “the Supreme 
Court [in its reaffirmation of the exemption,] had no intention of overruling 
Federal Baseball or Toolson despite acknowledging that professional baseball 
involves interstate commerce.”81  As one lower court stated, the “Supreme 
Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions.”82 
Similarly, Major League Baseball v. Butterworth83 is a case involving 
franchise contraction where MLB had announced a decision to contract two 
clubs, from thirty to twenty-eight.84  Applying the standard of determining 
whether the challenged action was part of the “business of baseball,” the 
Northern District of Florida held that contraction is included as part of the 
exempt actions under the business as a whole.85  The court explained that “[i]t 
is difficult to conceive of a decision more integral to the business of major 
73. See, e.g., Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420. 
74. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541. 
75. See, e.g., New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, No. 
93-253, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994). 
76. See generally id. 
77. See generally 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995). 
78. See generally 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999). 
79. See, e.g., McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457. 
80. Minn. Twins P’ship, 592 N.W.2d at 855–56. 
81. Id. at 856. 
82. McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457 (quoting Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 
F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
83. See generally 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001). 
84. Id. at 1318. 
85. Id. at 1331–32. 
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league baseball than the number of clubs that will be allowed to compete.”86  
The court again noted that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to overrule 
Federal Baseball and that Flood, in light of the obvious anomaly of the 
continued existence of the exemption, “was a ruling not about whether the 
antitrust exemption should be terminated but about who should make that 
decision.”87  As explained before, the intent expressed in Flood is that this 
change should be congressional, rather than judicial, in nature. 
2. The Curt Flood Act 
As far as any “significant” congressional action regarding the MLB 
exemption, only one important action has occurred.  In 1998, Congress 
enacted the Curt Flood Act, which specifically directs that MLB is now 
subject to the antitrust laws for acts “affecting employment of major league 
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level . . . to the same 
extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the 
antitrust laws” in other professional sports.88  That is, MLB players have the 
same rights as players in other professional sports to sue regarding 
employment terms. 
Although this statute technically narrowed MLB’s broad exemption to a 
certain extent, in reality, the Curt Flood Act has little actual effect due to the 
statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions.89  These exemptions effectively 
work together to immunize the other professional sports leagues from antitrust 
liability for actions that occur as part of the collective bargaining process 
between the multiemployer bargaining units and the players’ associations.90  
Given the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the collective bargaining 
process,91 players’ associations must decertify before seeking any antitrust 
remedies.92  Thus, although the Curt Flood Act technically narrows MLB’s 
broad antitrust exemption and opens MLB up to antitrust liability for labor and 
employment issues, the risk of liability is minimal. 
Significantly, Congress could have narrowed the scope of MLB’s antitrust 
exemption even more; however, as evidenced by the Curt Flood Act’s narrow 
reach, it chose not to do so.93  Instead, Congress expressed its intent that the 
86. Id. at 1332. 
87. Id. at 1331. 
88. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a). 
89. See MITTEN, supra note 12, at 436–80. 
90. Id. at 437, 470–71. 
91. Id. at 470; see generally Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
92. MITTEN, supra note 12, at 470–71. 
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b. 
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exemption should continue to apply to other components of the business of 
baseball.94  For example, the Curt Flood Act does not provide Minor League 
Baseball (MiLB or Minor League) players with any antitrust remedies, and, 
likewise, it does not apply to any other component of MiLB.95  Similarly, the 
statute explicitly excludes  
acts . . . or agreements . . . relating to or affecting franchise 
expansion, location or relocation, . . . ownership issues, . . . 
[and] the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of 
organized professional baseball and the licensing of 
intellectual property rights owned or held by organized 
professional baseball teams individually or collectively.96   
Thus, the Curt Flood Act would not apply to the actions of MLBP in 
granting an exclusive license to Topps for the use of MLB intellectual 
property on baseball cards. 
Given the “Baseball Trilogy,” combined with the many lower-court 
interpretations and the explicit language in the Curt Flood Act, it is clear that 
the MLB exemption should be considered broad in scope and apply to more 
than the reserve clause. 
III. AMERICAN NEEDLE 
Notwithstanding this fairly clear intent, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in American Needle, some have urged that the licensing issue 
with Upper Deck may have been a unique opportunity to bring yet another 
challenge to MLB’s broad exemption.97  Although the NFL does not benefit 
from an antitrust exemption, the comparison between the Upper Deck situation 
and that in American Needle makes sense for at least two reasons.  First, the 
factual circumstances in each case are substantially similar.  Second, the NFL 
and NFL Properties (NFLP) relied on the single-entity defense throughout the 
American Needle litigation.98  Many of the arguments and justifications 
proffered in support of this single-entity defense would likely be very similar 
to those MLB would employ if arguing in support of the inclusion of 
intellectual property and licensing agreements in the broad scope of MLB’s 
antitrust exemption. 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)–(d). 
95. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1). 
96. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(3) (emphasis added). 
97. See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8. 
98. See generally Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201. 
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The American Needle case arose when NFLP altered its long practice of 
granting nonexclusive licenses for use of the NFL’s intellectual property to 
vendors.99  American Needle had previously received such nonexclusive 
licenses for use on headwear but was no longer able to make and sell items 
containing the NFL trademarks after NFLP granted Reebok an exclusive ten-
year license.100  American Needle then sued, alleging violations of the 
Sherman Act.101  In response, the NFL argued that it was a single-entity 
immune from scrutiny under the Sherman Act.102 
The single-entity defense refers to situations where Section One violations 
are alleged, but defendants claim that they are not capable of engaging in a 
“‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy’” because they are actually a single 
enterprise acting for the sole benefit of an overarching corporation.103  For 
instance, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,104 the Supreme 
Court concluded that a corporation “and its wholly owned subsidiary . . . are 
incapable of conspiring with one another for purposes of [Section One] of the 
Sherman Act”105 because of the functional relationship between the parent 
corporation, as the sole source of economic power, and its wholly owned 
subsidiary’s “complete unity of interest.”106  This relationship is distinguished 
from a pure joint venture where there are multiple parent corporations acting 
together for a specific purpose that remain distinct and separate entities subject 
to Section One scrutiny.107 
Using the reasoning from Copperweld, the NFL urged that it was a single-
entity in regard to the licensing of intellectual property by NFLP.108  The 
Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment, concluding that with 
regard to “‘the facet of their operations respecting exploitation of intellectual 
property rights, the NFL and its [thirty-two] teams . . . have so integrated their 
operations that they should be deemed a single entity rather than joint ventures 
cooperating for a common purpose.’”109  Although acknowledging that there 




103. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1). 
104. See generally id. 
105. Id. at 777. 
106. Id. at 771. 
107. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 726, 737–38, 743–44 (2010). 
108. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. 
109. Id. (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. 
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may be aspects of NFL operations that should be classified as a joint venture, 
limiting its analysis to the licensing of teams’ intellectual property through 
NFLP, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the 
NFL was acting as a single-entity in this context.110  In a somewhat bizarre 
twist, with support from other professional sports such as the National 
Basketball Association and National Hockey League in the form of amicus 
briefs, the NFL supported the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in the hopes that 
the Supreme Court would affirm the NFL’s single-entity status, and, therefore, 
provide the NFL and other professional sports organizations with increased 
protection from antitrust liability.111 
In its brief before the Supreme Court, the NFL provided justifications for 
the single-entity application in this licensing context, both echoing the lower 
courts’ reasoning and expanding on it.112  Specifically, the NFL’s argument at 
its most basic level was that “each club’s economic value derives from its 
membership in the NFL and its role in the production of NFL Football.”113  
Intellectual property of the NFL and its clubs is integral to this collective 
production of NFL football, as “the competition on the field features the clubs’ 
names, the logos that adorn the players’ uniforms, the uniform designs, and 
each club’s official colors.”114 
The NFL explained further that “[t]he clubs’ intellectual property derives 
its value from the production of NFL football.  Consumers buy hats, shirts, 
and other goods bearing club marks . . . not because those symbols have 
intrinsic value or independent appeal, but rather because they represent 
affiliation with an NFL team.”115  Recognizing this economic reality, the NFL 
formed NFLP to serve as a centralized outlet for managing and marketing the 
NFL’s intellectual property.116  According to the NFL, NFLP serves as the 
“‘single driver’ of the teams’ ‘promotional vehicle,’ ‘“pursuing the common 
interests of the whole.”‘“117 
Unfortunately for the NFL and many other professional sports leagues, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions on the sole issue of 
“whether the alleged activity by the NFL respondents ‘must be viewed as that 
Ill. 2007)). 
110. Id. 
111. McCann, supra note 107, at 735. 
112. See generally Brief for Appellee-Respondent, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 
(2010). 
113. Id. at **14. 
114. Id. at **15. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at **16 (citation omitted). 
117. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770). 
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of a single enterprise for purposes of [Section One]’” applicability.118  The 
Court held that the centralized activities and control regarding NFL 
intellectual property and licensing through the NFLP were not those of a 
single-entity, and thus remanded the case to be evaluated on the merits of the 
Sherman Act claim.119 
Because of the antitrust exemption, MLB currently has no need to attempt 
to defend an antitrust violation using the single-entity defense.  Therefore, the 
specific reasons for the Supreme Court’s refusal in the American Needle case 
to characterize the NFL as a single-entity in the licensing and marketing of 
intellectual property are not particularly relevant to MLB.  Notwithstanding 
this fact and the ultimate failure of the NFL’s justifications in support of its 
single-entity defense, those same justifications could play an integral role in a 
future challenge to MLB’s antitrust exemption in the licensing and 
promotional context.  To fully comprehend this alternative use for the NFL’s 
single-entity defense, justifications for retention of MLB’s exemption in other 
contexts should be examined. 
IV. MLB LICENSING AND THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
Although the existence and scope of MLB’s exemption have been 
challenged in a variety of contexts, it has not yet been directly at issue in any 
judicial challenge to an exclusive licensing agreement.  To be clear, MLB 
licensing arrangements have previously been the subject of an antitrust suit.120  
Notably, though, the MLB exemption itself has not been at issue because 
MLB successfully defended the suit under a rule of reason analysis rather than 
defending it based on its exemption from the purview of the antitrust laws.121 
Some attorneys and commentators opined that Upper Deck might respond 
to the trademark infringement suit filed against it by bringing an antitrust suit 
against MLB with the possibility that MLB’s exemption would be at issue.122  
In light of the Supreme Court’s refusal in American Needle to award the NFL 
with single-entity status and its concomitant protection from antitrust liability, 
some believed that courts might also be willing to narrow the scope of or 
remove MLB’s broad antitrust exemption if it was similarly challenged in the 
licensing context.123 
118. Id. at 2208 (citation omitted). 
119. Id. at 2212–17.  
120. See generally Salvino, 542 F.3d 290. 
121. See generally id. 
122. See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8. 
123. See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8. 
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The Upper Deck licensing situation is MLB’s version of American 
Needle.124  Similar to the centralized licensing functions of NFLP, MLBP 
serves as “the exclusive worldwide agent for licensing the use of all names, 
logos, trademarks, . . . and other intellectual property owned or controlled by 
the MLB Clubs, MLB’s Office of the Commissioner . . . and MLBP . . . on 
retail products.”125  Much like NFLP with regard to the headwear at issue in 
American Needle, MLBP generally granted nonexclusive licenses for the use 
of its logos and other marks on baseball cards.126  However, in 2009, MLBP 
entered into an exclusive agreement with Topps, a baseball card company, 
granting the company exclusive rights to the use of MLB trademarks on 
baseball cards.127  Therefore, Upper Deck, Topps’ long-time competitor and 
former MLBP licensee, was no longer able to legally use these marks.128  
Subsequently, Upper Deck produced cards with clearly visible MLB logos on 
the players’ uniforms that resulted in a trademark infringement suit filed by 
MLBP and a subsequent consent judgment in favor of MLBP.129 
Notwithstanding the arguably favorable holding in American Needle, had 
Upper Deck brought an antitrust challenge, or if a similar challenge in the 
licensing and intellectual property context were to arise, the existence of 
MLB’s exemption would more than likely remain unchanged.  Instead, as 
evidenced by the numerous aforementioned challenges to MLB’s exemption, 
it would be the scope of the exemption that would be at issue.130  Both the 
history of the exemption and the importance of intellectual property to the 
existence of MLB as an entertainment product support the notion that MLBP’s 
licensing and promotional activities would fall well within the scope of the 
exemption. 
A. Retention of the MLB Antitrust Exemption 
Although the scope of the exemption should be the focus, an overview of 
the arguments proffered in support of the exemption’s existence helps provide 
context for an analysis of the exemption in the modern era.  The court in 
Piazza attempted to undermine the stare decisis argument.131  Notwithstanding 
this fact, an argument in support of the exemption must necessarily start with 
124. McCann, supra note 107, at 772. 
125. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 294. 
126. See Singer, supra note 4. 
127. Id. 
128. The Upper Deck Co., No.10 Civ. 732, at *4–5. 
129. See generally id. 
130. See e.g., Finley, 569 F.2d 527. 
131. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437–38. 
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stare decisis because of the long history of the exemption and the stare decisis-
based reasoning in Toolson and Flood.132  It is no small fact that the 
exemption has been consistently reaffirmed, and 2012 will mark the ninetieth 
year of the MLB antitrust exemption’s existence.133  Those not in favor of 
MLB’s exemption could potentially turn to Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,134 a recent case where the Supreme Court strayed from the 
stare decisis principle in the antitrust arena in overturning Dr. Miles Medical 
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., a decision that had been upheld for almost 
100 years.135  In overturning Dr. Miles Medical, the Court ruled that the 
reasons upon which Dr. Miles Medical originally relied no longer existed.136  
Similarly, MLB’s exemption originally rested on the idea that MLB was not 
engaged in interstate commerce, but the Court has since recognized that this 
reason for the exemption no longer exists because MLB is now clearly 
engaged in interstate commerce.137 
Even though it is true that the Court overturned Dr. Miles Medical, 
important distinctions exist between the Dr. Miles Medical situation and the 
MLB antitrust exemption.  Unlike the decision in Leegin, which relaxed the 
standard of review used in the vertical price fixing context,138 the removal of 
MLB’s exemption would subject MLB to more antitrust liability rather than 
less, and it remains unclear as to whether removal of the exemption would 
actually promote any of the interests the antitrust laws exist to protect.139  
More importantly, the Court has explicitly expressed a desire to leave it to 
Congress to remove MLB’s exemption if it so chooses.140 
Additional arguments in support of the exemption’s continued existence 
specifically relate to franchise issues and protection of the Minor League 
system.  The key notion is that as a result of the antitrust exemption, MLB has 
structured itself in a certain way and removal of the exemption would 
132. See generally Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood, 407 U.S. 258. 
133. See generally Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. 200; see also Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood, 
407 U.S. 258. 
134. See generally 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
135. See generally Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. 877. 
136. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889. 
137. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
138. See generally Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877. 
139. See generally Andrew E. Borteck, Note, The Faux Fix: Why a Repeal of Major League 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Would Not Solve its Severe Competitive Balance Problems, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1069 (2004); see also Clark C. Griffith, BACKTALK: Good Reason for Baseball’s 
Antitrust Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, § 8, at 9. 
140. See e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. 258. 
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fundamentally alter the game as we know it.  Regarding franchise location and 
ownership issues, the basic argument is that “[i]f MLB were to lose its 
antitrust exemption, it could no longer prevent teams from moving to more 
lucrative markets that happen to be claimed by another team.”141  Eventually, 
it would no longer be profitable for a large market city to add another team.142  
This could lead to the elimination of some franchises, a decrease in quality of 
play, and a decrease in the cultural significance of the game.143 
Critics often claim that other professional sports leagues function just fine 
without an antitrust exemption, but this argument is weakened because of 
baseball’s unique Minor League system.144  The current Minor League reserve 
system incentivizes Major League clubs to subsidize the Minor League clubs 
and player development and can exist in its current form only because of the 
antitrust exemption.145  Without these subsidies, there would be “severe 
economic hardships for many minor league clubs,” which would eventually 
affect both the Minor and Major League structures.146  If the exemption was 
removed, some Minor League clubs would be able to survive and even thrive 
without the Major League, but this would certainly not be the case for a 
substantial amount of these teams, thus resulting in the elimination of some 
Minor League clubs that are so vital to, and beloved by, many small 
communities throughout the country.147 
Indeed, the arguments in favor of the retention of the MLB exemption are 
strong, regardless of the many counterarguments that can be made.  However, 
the existence of the exemption does not cut at the heart of the modern issues 
regarding MLB’s exemption.  Today, the real issue is the nature and extent of 
the scope of the exemption. 
141. Bruce Johnson, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Must Go, in STEE-RIKE FOUR! 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL? 140 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997). 
142. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 904, 915–17 (2011); see also William F. Shughart II, Preserve Baseball’s Antitrust 
Exemption, or, Why the Senators Are out of Their League, in STEE-RIKE FOUR! WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL? 143 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997); Borteck, supra note 139, 
at 1109. 
143. See Shughart, supra note 142, at 153–54; see also JEROLD J. DUQUETTE, REGULATING THE 
NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL AND ANTITRUST 16 (1999); Griffith, supra note 139. 
144. See Stanley M. Brand & Andrew J. Giorgione, The Effect of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption 
and Contraction on its Minor League Baseball System: A Case Study of the Harrisburg Senators, 10 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 58–60 (2003). 
145. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 122; see also Brand & Giorgione, supra note 144, at 50–52. 
146. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 122; see also Brand & Giorgione, supra note 144, at 50–52. 
147. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 123. 
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B. Intellectual Property Licensing as Exempt from the Sherman Act 
Although some lower courts have looked to Flood as exemplifying a very 
narrow scope of the exemption, limited just to actions involving MLB’s 
reserve clause,148 the explicit language used in the Curt Flood Act, combined 
with the overall judicial history regarding the scope of the exemption, 
demonstrates that it is proper to characterize the exemption broadly rather than 
narrowly.  Under this broad characterization, the actions of MLBP regarding 
licensing and intellectual property decisions must necessarily be included as 
part of the exemption. 
As the Court expressed in Flood, any changes regarding the exemption 
should be congressional in nature, rather than judicial.149  The Curt Flood Act 
represents the only significant related congressional action and, importantly, 
narrowed the exemption only insofar as MLB is now subject to antitrust 
scrutiny in the labor arena in the same way other professional sports leagues 
are subject to scrutiny regarding employment terms.150  However, Congress 
specifically chose not to narrow the exemption even further than what is 
effectively a nominal narrowing due to the statutory and nonstatutory labor 
exemptions.  In fact, with the specific language used in the Curt Flood Act, 
Congress expressed its intention that the exemption should continue to apply 
to many components of the business of baseball.151  Of particular relevance 
here, is that the statute explicitly does not apply to MLB’s actions regarding 
“the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional 
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned or held by 
organized professional baseball teams individually or collectively” through 
MLBP.152 
The standard under the “Baseball Trilogy” is that MLB’s exemption 
applies to the entire “business of baseball.”153  Thus, assuming that the 
exemption will continue to exist in some form unless Congress removes it 
completely, the key question in any antitrust suit against MLB will necessarily 
be whether the challenged action is included as part of the “business of 
baseball.”  As the court in Henderson Broadcasting expressed, to determine if 
a challenged action is included as part of the “business of baseball,” a court 
must decide whether the action is a “‘unique characteristic[]’” or “‘need[]’ of 
148. See, e.g., Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420. 
149. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283–84. 
150. See MITTEN, supra note 12, at 436–80. 
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1)–(3). 
152. Id. § 26b(b)(3). 
153. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541. 
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the game.”154  It is here that the previously articulated NFL arguments in 
support of the single-entity defense in American Needle become relevant to 
MLB.  Although the NFL’s arguments eventually failed as justifications for 
status as a single-entity, MLB need not attempt to categorize MLBP as a 
single-entity because it benefits from the exemption.  Rather, the NFL’s failed 
justifications precisely relate to why marketing, licensing, and promotion of 
MLB’s intellectual property most certainly falls within the “business of 
baseball.” 
Just like the NFL urged that “[t]he intellectual property of the NFL and its 
member clubs . . . is an integral part of NFL Football,”155 so, too, is the 
intellectual property of MLB an integral part of the MLB product.  Identical to 
reasoning expressed in the NFL’s brief in support of its single-entity defense, 
the production of MLB requires “the collective deployment” of intellectual 
property featured on the field such as “clubs’ names, the logos that adorn the 
players’ uniforms, the uniform designs, and each club’s official colors.”156  As 
expressed in Flood, baseball is a business.157  In addition to the use of 
intellectual property on the field specifically, the business of MLB as a whole 
is the “production and promotion of [teams’] joint entertainment product,”158 
which necessarily involves the licensing and marketing of intellectual property 
so as to better compete against other entertainment products as a business 
concerned with profits and losses. 
The entertainment value is directly related to continued fan interest in the 
league, which, in turn, directly affects a league’s profits, losses, and revenues.  
Continued fan interest in MLB and other professional sports is attributed to the 
uncertain outcome inherent in athletic competitions, a characteristic distinct 
from other forms of entertainment.159  In recognition of the importance of an 
uncertain outcome, professional sports leagues employ a variety of tactics to 
maintain and increase the competitive balance in their respective leagues in an 
attempt to ensure that small market teams have a reasonable opportunity to 
compete with large market teams such that this uncertain outcome is not 
lost.160  For instance, both the NFL and MLB “engage in extensive revenue 
and cost sharing . . . in an effort to enhance the ability of their product to 
154. Henderson Broad., 541 F. Supp. at 271. 
155. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 112, at **14. 
156. See id. at **15. 
157. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
158. See Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 112, at **14 (emphasis added). 
159. MITTEN, supra note 12, at 401–02. 
160. See id. at 401–02, 515–16. 
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compete against other forms of entertainment.”161  Because this competitive 
balance is necessary to ensure an uncertain outcome, it follows that the 
licensing and promotion of MLB’s intellectual property through MLBP is also 
a need of the game. 
Revenues generated by MLBP through its licensing agreements represent 
a portion of shared revenues and, thus, contribute to the pool of money 
distributed to all MLB teams to achieve the necessary competitive balance to 
enhance the entertainment value of the MLB product.162  In Henderson 
Broadcasting, the court held that broadcasting of MLB games was not part of 
the “business of baseball” as a unique characteristic or need of the game 
because it was an entirely “distinct and separate industry.”163  This decision 
simply does not hold true when it comes to actions of MLBP in licensing and 
promoting intellectual property, especially given the wide use of MLB 
intellectual property on the field as part of team logos and colors.  Similarly, 
the court in Postema held that the challenged actions were not unique 
characteristics or needs of the game because they “in no way enhance[d] its 
vitality or viability.”164  The exact opposite is true of MLB’s intellectual 
property.  The licensing and promotion of that intellectual property, quite 
literally, enhances the viability of MLB at a very minimum because of the 
importance of competitive balance and the fact that the MLB clubs share the 
revenues of MLBP.  Thus, were the exemption directly at issue in an antitrust 
challenge to the licensing and promotional activities of MLBP, these activities 
should be exempt as part of the “business of baseball.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the licensing and promotion of MLB’s intellectual 
property is a distinct need of the game and is, therefore, included as part of the 
“business of baseball.”  Thus, it should be exempt from the purview of the 
federal antitrust laws. 
MLB’s antitrust exemption can be traced back almost ninety years to the 
landmark decision in Federal Baseball.  Since then, the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed the exemption, and Congress has not yet taken any action to 
remove it.  Today, the exemption is an anomaly.  However, given the Court’s 
express intent to leave it to Congress to remove the exemption, and Congress’ 
explicit language in the Curt Flood Act limiting the statute’s reach, the 
161. See Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 112, at **11. 
162. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 294. 
163. Henderson Broad., 541 F. Supp. at 271. 
164. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489 (emphasis added). 
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exemption will continue to exist in some form for at least the foreseeable 
future.  Thus, courts in the modern era are faced with the task of defining the 
scope of the exemption. 
As previously explained, the issue of the exemption’s scope is more 
properly characterized as a determination of how to properly define the 
“business of baseball.”  Although some lower courts have interpreted Flood to 
limit the scope of the exemption under the “business of baseball” to situations 
involving MLB’s reserve clause, the “great weight” of authority recognizes 
that the exemption applies to the “business of baseball” as a whole.165  Upper 
Deck did not file an antitrust suit against MLB, but there will surely be another 
licensing situation in the future that might give rise to a challenge to MLB’s 
antitrust exemption.  There is no way of knowing for sure just how a court 
would rule on this issue because the exemption has not been an issue in such a 
context.  However, MLB can employ the NFL’s single-entity arguments from 
the American Needle case to demonstrate that intellectual property is part of 
the “business of baseball” as a vital need of the game.  As such, the licensing 
and promotion of MLB and its member clubs through MLBP is integral to the 
production of MLB and should be exempt from the purview of the federal 
antitrust laws. 
Sarah A. Padove 
 
165. See McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457. 
